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last is least significant but necessary for our purposes to distinguish intelligence and intelligence publications from items of information--e.g., Department of Agriculture reports--and from other governmental and public media--e.g., Newsweek--which otherwise might from time to time meet criteria (1) and (2).

6. If this definition is accepted, then, clearly, the DIN qualifies as a national intelligence publication. It does not deal exclusively, or even in the main, with departmental concerns; it receives wide dissemination among national-level consumers; and it is produced by a component of the Community.

7. If the DIN is not to be subject to a review of national intelligence, then it should cease publication of items of national interest and suspend dissemination to national readers.




Chief, PRD/IC

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Attachment:

4 Jan 75 Memo to 
from Gen. Graham

Distribution:


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CONFIDENTIALIC 75-1309
8 January 1975

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The DIN and National Intelligence

1. General Graham's letter to me raises anew an old question: What, in fact, is national intelligence?
2. The broadest (and easiest) definition simply states that intelligence of national consequence (i. e., of interest or significance to national-level US policy makers) is ipso facto national intelligence. This is, I think, easy to live with because it is simple, to the point, and does not become bogged down in questions of bureaucratic origin, coordination, etc.
3. But, since it defines the expression solely in terms of audience, it is not too helpful for our purposes here. It is too all-encompassing and cannot be applied to specific issues, such as which intelligence publications produced by the Community are truly national.
4. General Graham (who may be confusing the concept of national intelligence with the procedures of the National Intelligence Estimate) holds that the DIN is not national intelligence because it is not coordinated. Aside from ignoring the audience and the importance of a given piece of intelligence, this formula--which states implicitly that national intelligence is coordinated intelligence--is simply unworkable. (Some tactical intelligence may be coordinated, some national may not be; CIA, for example, has been producing high-level national intelligence which has not been coordinated for years--e. g., the PDB.)
5. Other definitions have been advanced. But for our purposes, it would suffice, I think, to define national intelligence as meeting three essential criteria: (1) it is important to national-level US interests and to national-level US policy makers; (2) it is disseminated, inter alia, to a national-level audience; and (3) it is produced by a member of the Intelligence Community. (The

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF E. O. 11652, AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT
TWO YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON

31 Dec. 1985

(Insert date or event)

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Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83M00171R000300270031-2

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